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I. Introduction
From time to time, the economy enters a recession and jobs are destroyed
simultaneously in all of the important sectors of the economy. At the same time,
firms liquidate inventories. What mechanism causes job losses and inventory
runoffs throughout the economy? A decline in demand seems a natural part of the
answer. But what does it mean for demand to fall for all the products in the
economy? What relative price adjusts to keep markets in equilibrium if demand
falls? The answers lie in intertemporal economics. Demand for products delivered
today can rise while demand for products tomorrow falls, just as demand for
potatoes can rise while demand for rice declines. The relative price that adjusts to
clear the market for products today against products tomorrow is the interest rate.
Accordingly, this paper explores the relation between the interest rate and job
destruction.
The data show that recessions are often preceded by sharp increases in real
interest rates. This paper builds an intertemporal model to mimic this relationship.
In the model, firms face the question of whether to continue the operation of
marginal plants and other productive units or to shut them down. An increase in
the interest rate shifts the decision toward shutdown because the firm avoids the
immediate costs of holding inventories and other capital, whereas the foregone
profit lies in the future. The burst of job destruction and inventory decumulation
that occurs during the sharp part of the typical contraction results from decisions
to shut down units in firms throughout the economy.
My focus in this paper is primarily on the interest-rate-job-destruction
mechanism and less on the source of demand shifts and accompanying changes in
the interest rate. The model describes the responses of workers and firms to3
exogenous changes in interest rates. The reason is that the large increases in
interest rates that have actually occurred in the U.S. economy in the past 30 years
seem to have a monetary origin, at least in large part. Because there is no
consensus on the proper model of the real effects of nominal driving forces, I
enter this difficult territory only in a tentative way in interpreting the empirical
relation between the interest rate, job destruction, and inventory decumulation.
The model considers productive units. A unit may be a plant, an operation
within a plant, or the activities of a single worker. A unit is shut down when its
continuation value falls below its liquidation value. The unit is closed and
liquidated and the workers enter the labor market to make new matches. The two
most prominent characteristics of recessions—bursts of job loss and high rates of
inventory liquidation—are the result of the same mechanism, in this view. The
role of shutdown decisions in inventory runoffs has not previously been explored,
to my knowledge. It is well known, however, that shutdowns of various types
account for a large fraction of the burst of job destruction that occurs at the
beginning of a recession (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh [1996]).
An essential ingredient in the model is explicit consideration of
unemployment and the time required to place workers in new jobs after earlier
jobs are destroyed. There has been an explosion of activity in the theoretical
macroeconomic literature incorporating unemployment—see Hall [1998a] for
many references. Almost without exception, modern research adopts the view of
Diamond [1982a] and Mortensen [1982] that unemployment is a bilateral search
process. Their framework also provides a clear way to think about job
destruction—the match between worker and firm ends when there is no longer
any joint surplus from the relationship.
The Diamond-Mortensen view presumes the efficiency of separations—
jobs end only when separation is in the joint interest of worker and firm. A
shutdown imposes substantial periods of foregone work on the job-losers and it4
may require investment to occur elsewhere in the economy to create replacement
jobs. Efficient decisions balance all of the positive and negative effects of a
shutdown on the firm and the workers. The negatives are the lost output from the
unit that is shut down and the resources needed to equip the replacement jobs (or,
equivalently, the diminution in productivity of other workers when newly hired
workers are squeezed onto existing facilities). The positives are the liquidation
value of the old unit and the higher level of output in a new unit, after the time for
the displaced workers to return to work. The first model in this paper assumes full
efficiency in job destruction decisions.
But the factual basis for efficient separation has yet to be established.
There are two reasons to question the assumption. First, the Diamond-Mortensen
employment relationship is inefficient with respect to the formation and
preservation of match-specific capital. Second, there are profound issues of the
observability of the information required for efficient separation. Consequently, I
also consider a related framework in which shutdowns are not necessarily
bilaterally efficient between employer and worker. In that framework, firms make
unilateral shutdown decisions guided by the profit they earn under simple fixed-
wage contracts with their workers. A shutdown sacrifices the present value of
profit from the unit—the difference between its revenue and the contractual wage
payments made to workers. The benefit of a shutdown is the avoided carrying
costs of the capital tied up in the unit. The model implies much higher volatility of
job destruction for given volatility of the real interest rate than the model with
efficient separations.
The paper presents empirical evidence on the joint behavior of job
destruction and inventory liquidation, on the one hand, and the discount rate on
the other hand. The variables I consider are the Davis-Haltiwanger [1990]
measure of job destruction, the change in employment, the change in inventories,
and the 6-month commercial paper rate stated in real terms. In a 9-industry5
breakdown of U.S. industries, I find a strong positive relation between job
destruction and the expected real rate and a strong negative relation between
employment growth and the expected real rate. In three of the four industries that
hold inventories (durables and wholesale and retail trade), there is a positive
association between the expected real rate and inventory liquidation (nondurables
are the exception).
II. Economics of the Shutdown Decision
The shutdown decision fits into the general framework of research on the
employment contract. That research has two branches relevant for this issue. The
older branch—currently inactive—includes Hashimoto and Yu [1980], Hart
[1983], Hall and Lazear [1984], and Kahn and Huberman [1988]. Separation or
shutdown decisions are made unilaterally by the worker or firm, subject to a
fixed-wage contract. The discussion of the design of the contract is strongly
influenced by the literature on mechanism design derived from Mirrlees’s [1971]
famous paper.
Modern thinking about the employment relationship, as reflected in
Diamond [1982a and b], Mortensen [1982], Ramey and Watson [1997], Caballero
and Hammour [1996a, 1996b, and 1997], and hundreds of other papers, insists
that strategic relationships, such as the employment relationship, satisfy the
criterion of subgame perfection. Parties will not adhere to terms such as fixed
wages that they can negotiate around later to their mutual benefit. An employment
contract does not necessarily guide the relationship as stated, but only establishes
the threat points for a subsequent bilateral bargaining problem. The Nash solution
to that bargaining problem—where the parties split the joint surplus from their6
relationship—governs the outcome. For further discussion of the relation between
the two branches, see Hall [1995, 1997, and 1998a].
The fixed-wage view leads naturally to the conclusion that inefficient
shutdowns can occur. The firm takes the wage as the value of the workers’ time;
if the wage overstates that value, the firm may shut a unit down despite the
resulting reduction in joint value. Firms pay the lowest wage needed to attract
workers in the first place and stick to that wage. In making decisions about
shutdowns, firms treat the wage as a cost. These contracts have the substantial
advantage of preventing workers from appropriating the investments that firms
sink in their relations with their workers. Firms enjoy the full benefits of those
investments and therefore invest up to the social optimum.
1
The modern view holds that fixed-wage contracts—whatever their
merits—fail the elementary test of subgame perfection. The parties have the
power to make Pareto improvements after random realizations occur and they
cannot be expected to fail to exploit the power. The source of the power is the
requirement that the employment contract gives both workers and firms the
unilateral rights to end the relationship. No practical contract can be designed
without these rights. The exercise of these rights defines the threat points of a
bargaining situation that exists throughout the relationship. In each period, the
parties divide the joint surplus—the difference between the continuation value
and the combined shutdown values—in specified proportions. Only when the
joint surplus reaches zero does shutdown actually occur, and shutdown is efficient
in this case.
As Mortensen [1982] pointed out in his original analysis, and recent
authors in this branch of the literature, such as Hosios [1990] and Caballero and
                                               
1 Caballero and Hammour [1996a, 1996b, 1997] stress the inefficiencies of appropriability but
assume that fixed-wage contracts cannot solve the problem, because of renegotiation.7
Hammour [1997] have stressed, match-specific investments are inadequately
compensated in the surplus-sharing setup, unless they are made jointly.
I will not try to resolve this major watershed issue in the modern theory of
the employment relationship. I develop two related models with efficient and
inefficient separations. My empirical results do not rest on assumptions one way
or the other about the efficiency of the employment relationship.
III. Inventories
A key feature of the view of recessions developed in this paper is that the
burst of inventory disinvestment that occurs during the sharpest part of the typical
contraction is the result of a process that also causes job destruction. Employment
changes and inventory investment are in fact closely linked, as Figure 1 shows. A
two-sided distributed lag relation between manufacturing inventory investment
(as a fraction of total GDP) and employment growth accounts for most of the
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Figure 1. Relation between Manufacturing Inventory Investment (as a Percent of
GDP, Solid Line) and a Distributed Lag of Employment Growth (Dashed Line)8
IV. The Model with Efficient Separation
This section develops a simple model of recessions where an increase in
the interest rate triggers a burst of job destruction. In the model, new productive
units are created when a searching worker is matched to a production opportunity.
Initially, the worker produces one unit of output per period, when equipped with
capital formed from g  units of output. With probability p  each period, the
productive opportunity degrades so that it produces only a fraction w <1 of its
earlier number of units of output with the same inputs.  After i instances of
random degradation, productivity is wi . The single economic decision in the
model is whether to continue a match.
There are nt  employed workers and ut  unemployed job searchers. At the
beginning of the period, the decision is made whether to continue the employment
of each worker in a lower-productivity job or to shut the unit down and release the
worker into search. Searching workers have a probability f  of finding a new,
high-productivity match each period (there are no congestion externalities).
Let dt  be the volume of job destruction—the number of workers released
as a result of shutdowns. Then workers transit among states as follows:
n n u d t t t t = + - - - 1 1 f   , (4.1)
u u d t t t = - + - 1 1 f b g   , (4.2)
To describe the decision about continuation versus shutdown, I let  Ji t ,  be
the value associated with a match with productivity wi and Ut  be the value
associated with unemployment and job search. The discounting of future returns9
in forming these values is governed by an exogenous random variable rt  that
obeys
r d e ( ) L rt t - = b g (4.3)

























where zt  is receipts at time t measured in units of goods.  E0 is the expectation as










 is the stochastic discounter in the sense of Kreps [1981] and
Hansen-Jagannathan [1991]; it is log-normal.
The current values are related to discounted future values according to
J E e J J U i t t
r i
i t i t t
t , , , max , = + - + + -
+ + + w p p g 1 1 1 1 b g e j { }  , and (4.5)
U E e U J t t
r
t t
t = - + - -
+ + 1 1 0, 1 f f g b g d i { }  . (4.6)
In equation 4.6, the firm and worker compare their joint continuation value,
E e J J t
r i
i t i t
t -
+ + + + - + w p p 1 1 1 1 b g e j , , , to their breakup value, g +Ut , and act
accordingly. The avoided investment cost, g , is key. By liquidating some10
inventories and not making new investments in inventories and other capital,
current outlays can be avoided or cash raised by shutting down. 
2
In the steady state with a constant interest rate, rt = d , workers remain in
their jobs until they have progressed through a critical number of productivity

































g 0 b g (4.8)
Here r e = - d 1 is the one-period steady-state interest rate. The value associated
with being in a new job is the present value of its future output plus the present
value of the successor job. The value associated with job search is the present
value of the new job after the period of search.
The cutoff value, k¸ is the one for which the corresponding search value
satisfies
w g w k k r U £ + £ - b g
1 (4.8)
                                               
2 In principle, there is a third option, to continue the affiliation of the worker and the firm, but
without working or holding capital (labor hoarding). The condition for this to occur is
1- > - e r i t e jg w . But the actual values never come close to this condition in practice.11
that is, current output wk-1 exceeds the opportunity cost of the alternative
activity, search, r U g + b g, at this level of productivity, but will fall short after the
next degradation lowers productivity to wk .








The model illustrates some simple points about reorganization and the
cleansing effects of recessions. The model considers both organizational and
physical capital. The organizational capital is formed when workers find high-
productivity jobs. Job destruction results in the formation of new organizational
capital—as workers are rematched, they start in jobs that are more productive at
first than were their old jobs. The steady state involves an optimal mix of physical
capital and organizational capital. The steady state could be made more intensive
in organizational capital by choosing a lower cutoff productivity state, k, implying
a higher cutoff level of productivity. Unemployment would be higher, as shown
by equation 4.9. In that case, the average level of productivity of employed
workers would be higher and physical capital would be lower (capital per worker
is  1-u b gg ). But that organizational capital is not worth its investment cost, that
is, the search time of workers. So additional cleansing does not pay off and does
not occur in the steady state. A temporarily high interest rate can cause job
destruction and subsequent formation of new organizational capital. The cleansing
effect then more than offsets the search costs.
The effects of an increase in the interest rate in the model are ambiguous.
Job destruction is part of the process of investing in organizational capital. On this
account, one would expect a higher interest rate to go with lower job destruction.
Times of high interest rates are times of scarce resources when it is appropriate to12
defer all types of investment, including the formation of organizational capital.
On the other hand, job destruction is also part of the process of disinvesting in the
capital resources tied up in low-productivity jobs. When the interest rate rises
above a critical level, it pays to release these resources immediately rather than to
retain them to make future production possible. The capital/labor ratio g  has a
key role. For lower levels of g , the role of organizational capital dominates and a
higher interest rate lowers job destruction. For higher levels, the role of physical
capital dominates and a higher interest rate stimulates job destruction.
I will use the model to calculate the response functions of job destruction
to innovations in the real interest rate, using the following parameter values:
g Inventory-sales ratio 6
d Mean of interest rate 0.06
r( ) L Autoregressive process for the interest rate 1 9 -. L
se Standard deviation of innovation to interest
rate
.01
f Job-finding rate 0.2
p Transition probability from high to low
productivity
0.2
w Relative productivity of match after
degradation compared to before
0.99
These values are illustrative and are not calibrated to empirical findings except in
the roughest way.
Details about the calculation of the impulse response functions are in an
appendix available from the author.
3 Briefly, I iterate backwards over equations
4.5 and 4.6, treating the variables J and U as functions of rt-1. This process
converges to stationary functions, which then yield a policy function that tells, for
each level of productivity, whether or not the worker should separate as a function13
of rt-1. Then I simulate forward, making a random draw for the innovation in the
interest rate each period, determining which productivity categories yield
separations. I also determine the volume of new hires from among the existing
unemployed and the movements of workers through productivity degradation. To
measure the impulse response function, I perform 10,000 pairs of simulations
over 100 periods. The first is performed as just described. The second uses the
same set of interest-rate innovations, except that the innovation in period 51 is
taken to be one standard deviation larger than before. I compile the difference
between the amounts of job destruction in each pair. The impulse response
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Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions of Job Destruction and Unemployment to a
Real Interest Rate Innovation
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions calculated in this way for
job destruction and unemployment in the model. Job destruction jumps to a peak
as soon as the shock to the real interest rate occurs. Destruction subsides over the
                                                                                                                    
3 http://www.stanford.edu/~rehall/14
next few periods. Unemployment rises quickly but not immediately to a peak, and
then gradually descends. The dynamics share important properties with actual
recessions—the sharp spike in job destruction accompanied by a high interest rate
followed by a prolonged period of above-normal unemployment.
Both impulse response functions drop below zero about 10 to 15 periods
after the shock. The model has the property of concentration that I describe in a
companion paper (Hall [1998b]). Once a shock has displaced workers and caused
them to find new jobs, the number of workers near the margin declines, and the
probability of destruction falls for an extended period. Episodes of job destruction
tend to be concentrated in time, because each episode depletes the stock of
vulnerable jobs. The next episode is less likely to occur until the gradual process
of degradation builds up a new stock of vulnerable jobs, close to the shut-down
margin.
V. Model with Fixed Wage
The model I consider here is the same as in the previous section, except
for the following: workers are all paid a fixed wage w. Firms make unilateral
decisions about separations. There is free entry of firms to the market. Searching
workers encounter prospective employers at the rate f . As in the previous case,
the encounter always results in a job, now because firms earn rents on their
workers.
The firm associates a value  Ji t ,  with a filled job at productivity wi . The
current value is related to the discounted future value according to
J E e w J J i t t
r i
i t i t
t , , , max , = - + - + -
+ + + w p p g 1 1 1 1 b g e j { } (5.1)15
In equation 5.1, the firm compares its joint continuation value,
E e w J J t
r i
i t i t
t -
+ + + - + - + w p p 1 1 1 1 b g e j , , , to the breakup value, g , and acts
accordingly. The free-entry condition implies that firms do not value a vacant job;
the breakup value is just the avoided investment cost, g .
In the steady state, workers remain in their jobs until they have progressed
through a critical number of productivity degradations, k. The cutoff value, k¸ is
the one for which the corresponding search value satisfies
w g w k k r w £ + £ -1 (5.2)
that is, current output wk-1 exceeds the opportunity cost of the capital, rg  plus
the wage, w, at this level of productivity, but will fall short after the next
degradation lowers productivity to wk . The wage replaces the opportunity cost of
the worker’s time, rU —compare equation 5.2 to 4.9.
If the fixed wage in the second model exceeds the opportunity cost as
determined in the first model, equation 5.2 shows that the cutoff level of
productivity will be higher (k will be lower) and thus unemployment will be
higher in the steady state.
The two models also differ sharply in their responses of steady-state
unemployment to the interest rate. Equation 5.2 shows that k and thus
unemployment will be unambiguously higher for a higher interest rate in the
fixed-wage model. The unilateral employment decisions made by firms in the
fixed-wage model do not incorporate the countervailing effects from higher
unemployment that result from efficient separation decisions.
Figure 3 shows the impulse response functions for the fixed-wage model,
with the wage held at w=0.5. Though the time patterns of both functions are
similar to those in Figure 2 for the efficient case, the magnitudes of the responses16
are vastly higher. Employment is far more fragile in the fixed-wage case, where
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Figure 3. Impulse Response Functions of Job Destruction and Unemployment to a
Real Interest Rate Innovation, Fixed Wage Case
In principle, it might be possible to shed light on the question of the
efficiency of separations by comparing the estimated response of job destruction
to financial impulses to the theoretical functions derived in this section. The
difference between the magnitudes of the responses for efficient and fixed-wage
employment arrangements seems large enough to create some hope. But, as the
next section shows, fundamental identification issues relating to general
equilibrium stand in the way of measuring the actual impulse response function.
The data are fully consistent with either strong or weak responses of job
destruction to financial impulses.17
VI. Measuring the Response of Job Destruction and
Inventories to Impulses in the Expected Real Interest Rate
I take the time period to be a quarter and use the 6-month commercial
paper rate as the nominal interest rate, the change in the GDP deflator as the
inflation rate, and the Davis-Haltiwanger measures of quarterly job destruction in
manufacturing durables and non-durables. Table 1 documents the relation
between the interest rate and job destruction and inventory changes. Within the
first quarter, the responses are always in the opposite direction from those
expected if the interest-rate changes are exogenous. Job destruction falls and
inventory investment rises. In three of the four cases, the relation is statistically
unambiguous. There is a strong case that changes in economic activity from other
sources are inducing changes in the interest rate within the quarter.
Lag Durables Non-durables
Destruction Decumulation Destruction Decumulation
0 -0.493 -0.86 -0.273 -0.07
(0.106) (0.23) (0.117) (0.26)
1 0.169 -1.17 0.127 -0.50
(0.075) (0.27) (0.093) (0.27)
2 0.280 0.61 0.092 0.10
(0.052) (0.29) (0.109) (0.30)
3 0.266 0.56 0.172 .83
(0.083) (0.22) (0.095) (0.30)
4 0.073 1.19 0.004 -0.07
(0.067) (0.26) (0.095) (0.21)
Table 1. Regression Coefficients for Current and Lagged Interest Rates.
Dependent variables are the Davis-Haltiwanger job destruction rates and the ratio of the negative of real
inventory changes to real inventory stocks. Right-hand variables are a constant, current and four lagged values of
the 6-month commercial paper rate, and, for job destruction, a dummy for the first quarter of the year. Standard
errors in parentheses were calculated by the Newey-West HAC procedure. The sample covers 1972, 2
nd quarter
through 1988, 4
th quarter for job destruction and 1959, 1
st quarter through 1996, 4
th quarter, for inventory
decumulation.18
Most of the coefficients on the lagged values of the interest rate have signs
corresponding to the case of exogenous changes in the interest rate. The sum of
the coefficients for the four lagged values of the interest rate has that sign in all
cases and its magnitude is statistically unambiguous in all cases but non-durables
inventory changes. The relations shown in Table 1 could be interpreted as the
combined effect of a speedy influence that pushes interest rates and job
destruction in opposite directions and a slower influence that pushes them in the
same direction. The second is the one embodied in the models of the previous two
sections, where exogenous increases in interest rates cause job destruction and
inventory runoffs. The first involves the response of interest rates to other
impulses, such as a shock to technology that lowers job destruction and raises the
interest rate at the same time.
Two steps are required to consider the issue more formally. First is to
move from the nominal interest rate to the expected real interest rate. Second is to
develop an identified model containing both the positive feedback from other
sources of variation in economic activity to the interest rate and the mechanism
based on exogenous changes in the real interest rate considered earlier in this
paper.
A. Innovations in the Expected Real Interest Rate
I use a model of the joint distribution of the nominal interest rate, the rate
of inflation, and job destruction to infer innovations in the real rate and to
















where nt  is the nominal interest rate, pt  is the rate of inflation, and dt  is the job
destruction rate. I assume that  yt  obeys a VAR,
y A L y t t t = + - ( ) 1 e (6.2)
The real interest rate is
r n E t t t t = - + p 1 (6.3)
Note that
E A y t t t p + = 1
2 ( ) (6.4)
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y E y i t i t t i - - - = > 1 0   for all  (6.8)
To estimate the response of job destruction to innovations in the expected
real interest rate, it is useful to deal with transformed contemporaneous variables,
$ y R y t t = 0 (6.9)
The first element of the transformed vector is the nominal rate less the part of the
future rate of inflation forecasted by current inflation and other variables. The
second and third elements are the inflation rate and job destruction. The
transformed vector obeys a vector autoregression,
$ ( ) $ ~
$( ) $ ~
















Note that the transformed variables  $ yt  obey a VAR of the same order as  yt ,
whereas the variables  ~ yt  have a VAR representation of infinite order.
B. Identification
The vector autoregression implies a moving-average relation between the
two key variables and two of the impulses, a subset of the full moving-average
















where C L ( ) is the matrix of impulse response functions, ht  is an innovation
considered to be a financial shock, and nt  is another innovation considered to be
an output shock resulting from technology or other forces.
The complete set of impulse response functions of a three-variable VAR is
three parameters short of identification. My identifying assumptions are:
1. The financial shock does not affect inflation within the same quarter,
2. The output shock does not affect inflation within the same quarter, and
3. The immediate positive effect of the output shock on the expected real
interest rate is a known multiple, r , of the immediate negative effect
of the output shock on job destruction.
The third assumption can be stated as
C C 1 2 0 0 ,2 ,2 ( ) ( ) = -r (6.12)
The coefficient r is the number of percentage points of effect on the expected
real interest rate from the output shock per percentage point of effect on the job
destruction rate.
Although this paper has avoided the difficult issue of general equilibrium
up to this point, it is impossible to interpret the empirical evidence without
dealing with the general-equilibrium issue encapsulated by this identifying
condition. There is a strong presumption that r is positive—when a non-financial
event raises output, it raises the expected real interest rate as well. The empirical
results presented at the beginning of this section support that hypothesis. I will
proceed by estimating the impulse response functions for two reasonable values
of r , 0.5 and 1.5.22
In practice, the method developed in this section involves fitting a vector
autoregression to the data on the nominal interest rate, the rate of inflation, and
the rate of job destruction. The VAR yields the coefficients of the inflation
prediction equation based on the immediate lagged values of the other variables,
as required by the data transformation in equation 6.9. Then I re-run the same
VAR as equation 6.10.
4 I obtain the impulse response functions corresponding to
the standard Choleski factorization with the variables in the order of inflation,
expected real interest rate, and job destruction. Finally, I calculate the impulse
response functions corresponding to my identifying conditions by multiplying the
reported functions by an orthonormal matrix that embodies the identifying
condition.
5
                                               
4 This is not a two-stage estimation process in any sense. Re-running the VAR is just a convenient
way to carry out calculations that could be done in one round of estimation. The results are
numerically the same.
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Figure 4. Estimated Response of Job Destruction to a Financial Impulse
Figure 4 shows the response of job destruction to a positive impulse in the
interest rate, estimated by the method developed in the previous section. The
results on the left side are for r =.5; that is, an output shock that raises job
destruction by 1 percentage point lowers the expected real interest rate by 0.5
percentage points. The results on the right side are for r =15 . . The values are
normalized to show the number of percentage points of job destruction caused by24
an impulse whose immediate effect is to raise the expected real interest rate by
one percentage point. Notice that the scales are different for the two values of r.
All four plots show a strong positive contemporaneous effect of the
financial impulse on job destruction. The plot on the top right, for stronger effects
on durables job destruction running from the output impulse to the interest rate,
look quite similar to those from the theoretical model in Figure 3. These plots
show that the observed joint distribution of job destruction and the interest rate
are consistent with the mechanism developed in this paper. They could not be said
to demonstrate the importance of the mechanism, because they rest on the
identifying condition that there is another impulse—the output or technology
shock—that causes the expected real interest rate to move in the opposite
direction from job destruction. The regression results in Table 1 show that the
contemporaneous correlation of the interest rate and job destruction is actually
negative. I interpret that finding as showing the importance of the output shock,
not as evidence against the effect of the financial shock. But that interpretation
rests on the untestable prior belief that there is an output shock with a positive
effect on the expected real interest rate. These issues cannot be resolved without
the development of a full general-equilibrium model.
B. Employment Reductions
The rate of decline of employment is reasonably closely correlated with
job destruction and is available for all sectors of the economy. Figure 5 shows the
response of employment declines to innovations in the expected real interest rate,
estimated by the method outlined in the previous section. The dependent variable
is minus the percent change in employment. The responses are for the smaller
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Figure 5. Responses of Employment Decline to Innovations in the Expected Real
Interest Rate
All 9 industries show impulse responses similar to the one derived from
the theoretical model. A surprise increase in the expected real interest rate triggers
an immediate decline in employment, followed by small declines spread over the
future. In durables and construction, the effect turns negative over the 10 quarters
shown in the plots in Figure 5.26
C. Inventory Decumulation
Figure 6 shows the responses of inventory decumulation to an impulse in
the expected real interest rate. Again, these responses are measured under the first
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Figure 6. Responses of Inventory Decumulation to Innovations in the Expected Real
Interest Rate
In all four inventory-holding sectors, the immediate burst of inventory
decumulation predicted by the model is evident in the plots. The immediate
dynamics for inventories are similar to job destruction. In durables, inventory
decumulation continues in succeeding quarters, along with job destruction. But in27
the other three industries, inventory decumulation virtually ceases one quarter
after the real interest rate impulse, contrary to the findings for job destruction. In
the model developed earlier in the paper, the dynamics of job destruction and
inventory decumulation are the same. Of course, the findings for inventory
decumulation are tentative in the same way as those for job destruction and
employment declines—they rest on an assumed identifying condition.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
There are good reasons to believe that events that cause increases in the
expected real interest rate also cause job destruction along the lines of the model
developed in this paper. Let me return to an issue raised in the introduction: Could
it be that high interest rates reduce product demand, so that the observed
association arises not from the influence of the discount rate on shutdown
decisions, but rather from the influence on demand? In a competitive general-
equilibrium model, the state of demand is conveyed to the firm by the price of the
firm’s product. Thus, coherent ideas about product demand relate to changes in
the relative prices of products. There are two types of relative prices that might be
considered in this context. First is the price of output today relative to the price of
output next period. That price is the interest rate and has been the subject of this
paper. In that sense, the financial effects considered here could be called demand
effects.
The second is the relative price of two kinds of products. In particular, the
relative price of durables and non-durables could be volatile in a model where the
two types of products are not close substitutes in production, that is, in a two-
sector model. An exogenous decline in the price of durables relative to non-
durables would cause job destruction in durables in a two-sector model. But the28
other side of the coin is that the price of non-durables would rise relative to
durables, which would reduce job destruction in non-durables. So forces that
cause changes in relative prices induce reallocation of labor from one sector to
another. They cannot cause job destruction in every sector.
The subject of this paper is aggregate job destruction and the investigation
of forces that could cause job destruction in all sectors. It remains an interesting
and unresolved issue whether forces other than exogenous increases in interest
rates are likely to cause widespread job destruction. But I believe it is fair to
conclude that mechanisms operating through demand in the sense of relative
product prices are not the whole answer to the puzzle of recessions, where jobs
are destroyed everywhere. The following view does not survive scrutiny within a
general-equilibrium model: Adverse financial shocks reduce the demand for
interest-sensitive durable goods, and the effects quickly radiate to all the sectors
of the economy.
The model in this paper can co-exist peacefully within a two-sector model
where the effect of financial shocks is greater in the durables sector than
elsewhere. But there has to be enough job destruction in non-durables from the
intertemporal mechanism developed here to overcome the stimulus to non-
durables employment from the atemporal relative-price effect.
What causes the increases in the real interest rate that drive aggregate job
destruction in the view developed in this paper? The volatility of interest rates
remains largely a mystery in modern general-equilibrium macroeconomics.
Monetary policy seems to be an important part of the story. Sharp increases in the
rate often occur in times of monetary tightening—1969, 1974, 1980, and 1982.
There appears to be a substantial role for the monetary authority to trigger a burst
of job destruction and inventory liquidation by stepping hard on the monetary
brake. Explanation of this role requires an understanding of monetary non-
neutrality, an elusive subject.29
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